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I. Introduction
The international drug control regime is formulated under a basic paradigm: all drugs
included in the convention schedules I, II and IV can only have medical and research
uses. The policies derived from these conventions forbid all recreational, ritual, experi-
mental, or self-medicating consumption of coca, cocaine, opium, heroin, marijuana and
many other drugs. The conventions allow the production of controlled drugs for medical
and research uses and criminalize all other production. Where consumption is concerned
they are less rigid, as users of illegal drugs do not have to be arrested or jailed.
Anti-drug policies seek to suppress both illicit drug supply and demand but are for-
mulated without clearly spelling out the reasons why there is a demand and a supply for
illegal drugs. To understand illegal drug demand and supply it is necessary to have clear
answers to fundamental criminological questions such as: Why do people commit
crimes? Or why some individuals contravene formal or informal norms while others do
not? Policymakers, however, do not hesitate to formulate and implement anti-drug poli-
cies without having first considered those questions. They proceed as if their answers
were obvious or known. Yet, when asked about the reasons why the illegal drugs indus-
try develops in a location, most answers are highly questionable and at best partially
right. The aim of this essay is to show this using Colombia as an example.
II. The requirements of illegal cocaine production
There is no factor which, once in place, will always produce an illegal activity. The
production of illegal goods or services do not have sufficient factors, although there are
some necessary ones without which there would not be illegal economic activity. There
are also innumerable contributing factors that increase the probability that the illegal
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activity will develop. There are also preventive factors or reasons that are the inverse of
many contributing ones.
A. Necessary factors
The development of an illegal drugs industry requires an illegal demand and an ille-
gal supply. This is trivial but basic: without an illegal demand and an illegal supply, there
would be no illegal production, trafficking or consumption. 
While illegal demand is necessary, the frequently made statement: “when there is a
demand there will be a supply” is not a sufficient condition for the production of a good
or service. As shown in several places (Thoumi 2003, 2005a, 2009), despite the high ille-
gal profits most countries that can grow coca and poppy and refine cocaine and heroin do
not. The existence of a demand does not guarantee that the product or service demanded
will be produced. 
While demand is necessary, supply does not develop unless other conditions are met.
The question is: what are the necessary conditions for supply to develop? These are
dependent on the illegal nature of the activity in question. Illicit drug industries require
the performance of several industry-specific tasks that are not required by licit activities:
the growing of illegal crops, the development of illegal distribution networks, etc. “Suc-
cessful performance of these tasks requires special ‘illegal skills’ used to develop illegal
business organizations, social support networks to protect the industry from law enforce-
ment efforts, and contract enforcement and conflict resolution systems within the crimi-
nal organizations, to have the will to break economic laws and regulations and to use
violence if necessary” (Thoumi 2003: 56). 
In order to develop illegal skills and undertake illegal tasks there have to be people
willing to break some laws. Illegal economic activities beyond petty crime require plan-
ning, the participation of a group and the development of a support network of people
who are willing to break the law and who consider such behavior appropriate. A coca-
cocaine and poppy-heroin export industry requires complex illegal organizations that
can grow only in countries where there are groups whose social or informal behavior
rules and norms differ substantially from the formal rules and norms formulated by the
government which prohibit drug production and trafficking.
When the rule of law prevails, crime is limited to that committed by a few “bad
apples” or individuals whose behavior is deviant in the society. Common police and
judicial system law enforcement efforts can keep crime levels low. But if a significant
part of the society does not accept the formal rules as legitimate; if many individuals are
comfortable breaking those laws; if breaking laws is justified because they are or appear
to be captured by particular groups that benefit from them, then the society becomes vul-
nerable to the development of illegal economic activities. 
There are, however, countries that do have a gap between formal and informal behav-
ior norms and do not have significant organized crime problems. For the illicit drug
industry to develop, one of two other conditions is necessary. First, the informal social
norms of behavior have to allow individuals to disregard the effect of their actions on
other people so that the negative effects that drugs may have on consumers and society at
large are not an obstacle to engaging in illicit production or trafficking. An ethnically
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divided society may have a group whose social norms differ from the formal ones. But if
the group has strong social cohesion, solidarity, dignity and respect for human life, it
would not produce or traffic in a product or service that is perceived as damaging to its
fellow humans. If through time the gap among norms results in increased illegal behav-
ior and impunity, if social controls break down and a strong amoral individualistic cul-
ture develops, then the probability of engagement in illegal activities increases. Second,
individuals or social groups might feel justified producing drugs because they can be a
weapon against other groups or a foreign country. This would be the case of a group that
takes up arms or uses drugs to fight for what they consider a superior goal such as over-
throwing the government or liberating the country. 
Illicit poppy and coca can grow in many countries and regions although very few
actually do grow them and their production is highly concentrated. Three countries pro-
duce more than 90% of these two crops. One can find many countries with “weak states”
and social conflicts among various groups, countries that could grow these crops but do
not. To do so it is also necessary to develop illicit networks and to link with international
criminal ones. This is why having smuggling organizations that have strong links with
the outside world and the international economy increases the probability of illegal
industry growth. 
These necessary conditions can be summarized in a nutshell as illegal demand, wide
legal-informal norm gaps, disregard for externalities or the will to commit crime to
achieve a higher goal, and the ability to develop illegal networks and links. 
There are other necessary factors related to cocaine and heroin production functions
such as having the chemical knowledge to refine cocaine or heroin and having the appro-
priate environmental conditions to grow coca or poppy. The labor skills needed are abun-
dant in almost every country today and can easily be hired. 
B. Contributing factors in Colombia
Illegal drugs production and trafficking can be stimulated by many contributing fac-
tors. In Colombia the following have been considered: the geopolitical location of the
country (MacDonald 1989); unemployment and economic crises (Arango/Child 1987
and Arango 1988); the large migration of Colombians to the United States from the
1960s on which facilitated the development of illegal distribution networks
(Krauthausen/Sarmiento 1991, Thoumi 1995); the lack of state presence in large parts of
the country (Dombois 1990); its widespread smuggling experience (Craig 1981), and
corruption (Sarmiento 1990: 33). The last two factors, though, require a norms gap. One
may also argue that other factors such as poverty, inequality, experience with periods of
high violence, large population displacement and increases in single parent families can
also trigger the development of the illegal drugs industry. 
The nature of the political regime is also a relevant factor. An authoritarian regime,
for instance, can apply stronger repressive policies than a democracy which is concerned
with the protection of human rights. It is questionable, however, how successful a repres-
sive, authoritarian regime can be in the long run because it tends to fall prey to corrup-
tion. Furthermore, a regime that generates feelings of exclusion among some groups may
also be a contributing factor to crime.
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To sum up, no factor is sufficient for the development of illegal crops or illegal drug
trafficking. Some factors are necessary to develop coca and poppy plantings and cocaine
and heroin production and exports. To do so countries must have the full set of necessary
factors. There is also a wide spectrum of potential contributing factors. These might trig-
ger the development of the illegal industry only if all the necessary conditions are present.
The lack of a sufficient factor makes it possible to have a society with all the condi-
tions for the development of the illegal industry and which has, however, not developed
it. Such a society, however, would be very vulnerable and could develop the illegal
industry. The appearance of a new contributing factor, for example, could trigger it.
Criminal activities develop as a result of evolutionary processes, not Newtonian ones
with well defined causality of the type “Y=f(X)” that is “if X then Y happens”. This is
why some societies that have all the necessary conditions for the development of the
industry do not currently have it.1
It should be acknowledged, however, that the structure of illegal drugs development
presents an important identification problem for the conditions for its development. The
necessary conditions tend to be in the background and the contributing ones are seen as
triggering the industry’s development and thus looked at as its causes. As one can see in the
following section, this has been the case with most of the literature on drugs in Colombia.
III. The Diverse Reasons Used to Explain Why Colombia is one of the Main
Illegal Drug Producers
Most authors identify illegal cocaine demand abroad, mainly in the United States, as
the main reason why Colombia produces cocaine. Colombia is seen as a victim of the
“insatiable” demand for illegal drugs internationally. These authors may be classified in
two groups: those who develop political economy and political arguments, and those
who use mainstream economic arguments. Some of the critics present exculpatory argu-
ments and argue that drug addiction must be controlled and that Colombia cannot stop
production because its causes are exogenous. Others go beyond that and are justificatory.
They imply that it is fine for Colombia to be producing and exporting drugs as a reaction
to an unfair world. As shown below, most analysts take for granted that Colombia pro-
duces illegal drugs and do not look at the necessary, sufficient and contributory domestic
factors that encourage such production. 
A. The exculpatory and justificatory political economy arguments 
Writers like the very popular columnist Antonio Caballero present Colombia as a
victim of American prohibitionist policies designed to generate large wealth in the US
1 This is similar to a case in which a patient is diagnosed with a terminal illness such that every person
with it has a deficiency of vitamin xyz which, if corrected, cures the patient. The patient, however, finds
that there are many people who have this deficiency who do not develop the illness. In this case the
patient will not refuse to take the xyz vitamin pills until a physician explains to him why others did not
develop the illness. 
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and block legal Colombian economic development. The following quotes clearly show
this position: “Far from generating any wealth in Colombia [illegal drugs] have drowned
the country in corruption and violence. They increase Gross National Product in the
United States and destroy it in Colombia” (Caballero 1996: 139); “The war (our war) is
fed by coca, the only thing we are allowed to produce profitably” (Caballero 2004a);
“the ‘drug trafficking links’ are taken for granted. All Colombians have them, like we
have amoebas… Even our two candidates for the papacy, Monsignors Darío Castrillón
and Alfonso López Trujillo, have them. These links are perhaps not as strong as those of
the Americans who consume and pay for all of the drugs produced in Colombia”
(Caballero 2004b); “A government (of the United States) that realizes that it is incapable
of making its citizens obey those laws that prohibit drug consumption and transfers the
costs to the producing countries and keeps the benefits for itself” (Caballero 2006) . 
Orejuela Díaz (1997) follows a similar line of thought. He argues that the pressure
that the U.S. government put on the Turbay administration to aerially spray marijuana
fields was simply a protectionist effort by the United States: “It was all clear: the enemy
to be attacked was not marijuana. It was Colombian marijuana, with the aim of benefit-
ting American marijuana. The goal was to control a market with retail revenues of close
to $25 billion” (29)2. 
These arguments promote and reflect the fact that many Colombians take the illicit
drug industry for granted. This is reinforced by cultural expressions like the “corridos pro-
hibidos” that celebrate drug trafficking.3 Songs like “No soy culpable”, “El rey de los
capos”, “Corrido del cocalero”, “El cartel de Cali” and “El gran mafioso” that are played
frequently in coca and poppy-growing regions and in low income urban neighborhoods
portray drug traffickers as heroes and role models, the police as corrupt, Pablo Escobar as a
sadly missed benefactor, American society as dependent on drugs and the cause of the drug
problem, drug traffickers as entrepreneurs that succeed because they have the cunning and
guts to do what others cannot, and the American justice system as biased against Colom-
bians. In the 1980s many of these songs were commissioned by Colombian traffickers.
The following statements, which are part of the conventional wisdom of many (not
all) Colombians, are deserving of analysis. They can be grouped into three categories.
The first views drugs as a strictly market phenomena, the second argues the great bene-
fits of prohibition for the American economy and the third focuses on the double stan-
dards of American society.
1) STRICTLY MARKET ARGUMENTS: “WHEN THERE IS DEMAND, THERE IS SUPPLY”
This assertion is frequently accompanied by “There will allways be a producer.” The
sentence: “So why shouldn’t be us?” is normally left implicit. Granted, the existence of a
2 This assertion could of course be turned around by an American Antonio Caballero: “A government (of
Colombia) that realizes that it is incapable of making its citizens obey its laws that prohibit drug pro-
duction, transfers the costs to the consuming countries and keeps the benefits for itself”.
3 “Corridos prohibidos” are popular songs that originally appeared in Mexico and tell the stories of drug
traffickers, guerrillas, coca-producing peasants and harvesters and other personalities associated with
the illegal drug trade. Wald (2001) is a pioneer study of this phenomenon. 
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demand tends to induce production, but producers also seek to open up new markets,
introduce new products, advertize, etc. Producers are not merely passive actors who
react to active consumers. The dynamics of the cocaine market are particularly illustra-
tive. In 1980 the wholesale price of cocaine in the United States was reported at around
$50,000 per kilo. Today it is around $15,000 per kilo. The American Consumer Price
Index increased from 100 in 1980 to 237 in 2005. In real terms then, the wholesale price
of cocaine at the American port of entry declined at least 90%. This huge fall indicates
that the “insatiable American market” has been saturated for a long time and that the
growth in supply has driven market prices down over the last thirty years. Thus, it cannot
be argued that cocaine supply has grown as a passive response to cocaine demand.
Cocaine demand and supply interact as in any other market; indeed, cocaine producers
have sought new markets outside the United States and have also developed other prod-
ucts there like crack,and “bazuco” or “paco” in Latin America. 
2) BENEFITS OF PROHIBITION
“The lion’s share of the profits remains in the United States”
This implies that there is an unjust distribution of illegal profits to the benefit of the
consuming countries and that American crooks make a lot more money than Colombian
ones. Those who argue this implicitly dismiss the argument that risks in U.S. illegal mar-
kets are high and are the reason for the high illegal profits there. Furthermore, they do
not consider that those profits are U.S. value-added, generated in American markets.
Curiously, those who complain about the underlying unfairness of profit distribution in
the illegal cocaine market do not express the same feelings about the legal coffee or
flower markets in which “most profits remain in the U.S.”.
“The United States prohibits cocaine because it cannot grow coca and keep 
the business”
This implies that the United States seeks to block Colombia’s comparative advantage
and fails to explain why it is that the United States does not prohibit imports of other
goods it cannot produce to “keep the business”. If this assertion were true we would have
a fascinating new theory of development through illegality: if, for example, Colombia
were to declare cigarettes illegal, trafficking organizations would enrich themselves and
the country would develop. Besides, it is not true that in the United States there are no
places where coca can grow. Granted, there are not many, but it can grow in Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands and Guam. Indeed, during World War II, when cocaine was still used
medically, Harry Anslinger, the famous head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, devel-
oped an experimental plantation in Puerto Rico (Jordan 1999).
“Drugs contribute substantially to the U.S. economy that depends on them” 
The validity of this assertion rests on several strong assumptions: first, that it would be
better for the United States to import an illegal product at a very high price, without generat-
Rev35-01  7/9/09  14:31  Página 110
Necessary, sufficient and contributory factors 111
ing any tax revenues, than the same legal product at a low price with taxes. Second, that it
would be better for the country to have an illegal industry in which traffickers make money
rather than having a state-sanctioned laboratory import, manufacture and distribute cocaine.
Third, that drug traffickers have more influence on the policy-making process than the large
firms that would benefit from the legal market. Fourth, that drug demand is an addition to
aggregate demand, that is that addicts and drug users would have saved what they spend on
drugs rather than spend it on legal goods and services. In reality, the growth of illegal drug
demand generates a displacement of legal to illegal demand. Besides, many addicts find it
impossible to keep a job and/or support their illegal habit, and resort to crime to finance it.
Those that argue that the United States needs drugs to maintain a high level of eco-
nomic activity appear stuck in the era that ended with the Great Depression when eco-
nomic policies compounded economic cycles. Furthermore, during the last fifteen years
the United States has been the main driver of the world economy and during the last five
or six it has had a very large current account deficit indicating that its absorption, that is
consumption plus investment plus government expenditure have exceeded what it has
produced. It is then impossible to maintain that the U.S. economy needs illegal drugs to
keep aggregate demand high.
“The world’s financial sector depends on the huge deposits of drug traffickers” 
This belief, shared by many, is false because, firstly, it implies that drug traffickers’
deposits are a net increase in bank deposits which raise the banks’ capacity to lend. To prove
this it is necessary to show that drug users and addicts would not have spent their cash oth-
erwise. If someone spends money at a supermarket, that cash is deposited at a bank. If that
person buys cocaine, chances are that it will take longer for the cash to reach a bank. Traf-
fickers tend to deposit in off-shore centers rather than in their local banks. Increased use of
illegal drugs then generates a shift away from deposits in local banks to off-shore banks.
Second, central banks have mechanisms to control loan expansion and circulating
cash. If illegal drug consumption were the determinant of money expansion, one would
have to accept that the traffickers would de-facto set world monetary policy.
Third, the illegal drugs industry generates large costs for the banking system. Gov-
ernments have created a long list of control measures like reports of cash deposits, inter-
nal auditing procedures and know-your-client requirements. Reuter and Truman (2004:
5) estimate these costs to the United States system and conclude that they are “substan-
tial but not overwhelming – on the order of $7 billion” per year. 
Fourth, the world illegal drug market is very large relative to variables such as the
Colombian GNP but it is not large relative to international money flows or deposits. Data
on the total revenue generated by illegal drugs is weak and the amount tends to be over-
estimated (Reuter/Greenfield 2001, Thoumi 2005b). If however, the figure of around $60
billion for annual U.S. retail drug sales is accepted, one concludes that the size of the
drug revenues that enter the financial sector to be laundered is not very large.4 About 50
4 Figures on illegal drugs are very unreliable. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) peri-
odically makes estimates. These show that there has been a significant decline from the highs of the late
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to 60 percent of the drug value added is generated in the final two transactions. Sellers at
that level tend to spend their income in cash in shopping centers, supermarkets and other
shops. The rest is spent by traffickers - also in cash - or deposited in the banking system.
It is then unlikely that more than $30 billion would be available for money laundering.
Even if one assumes (falsely) that this would be a net increase in bank deposits, the prof-
its generated would not be large for the financial system. 
Fifth, there is another important effect that has not been quantified. The growth of
the illegal industry and of any informal economic activity increases cash transactions
and the demand for cash. This leads to an increase in transactions that do not use the
financial system, which lowers total bank deposits and profits.
Of course, in the financial system there are corrupt officials and banks who benefit
from money laundering, mainly in off-shore centers. The point however, is that the finan-
cial system as a whole does not depend on illegal drug industry deposits and that they do
not increase its overall profits.
3) THE AMERICAN DOUBLE STANDARDS ARGUMENT
“The United States police do not pursue the American capos”
This assertion is consistent with the belief that large drug profits benefit the Ameri-
can economy and that drug distribution networks in the U.S. are controlled by capos or
large “cartels” as they were in Colombia in the 1980s.  
It should be noted that the mafias that grew during alcohol prohibition avoided the
illegal drug business. They engaged in less risky activities such as prostitution, gam-
bling, and control of garbage collectors and stevedores’ labor unions in large cities. The
reaction of the U.S. government against them has been strong. In 1970 it enacted the
famous Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) against organized
crime which expanded the Federal Government’s powers to fight against organizations
that profited from gambling, homicide, extortion, counterfeiting money and documents,
drug trafficking and other controlled substances and other crimes done by criminal orga-
nizations. This resulted in most capos being indicted and sentenced. A significant num-
ber of them have died in prison.
The illegal drugs industry in the U.S. is highly segmented and involves many groups.
These are mainly made up of natives who feel excluded from the American mainstream
and by recent immigrants or minorities. Some importers may deal with large quantities
of cocaine but inside the U.S. there is nothing that resembles the old Medellin and Cali
“cartels”. In the U.S. the number of inmates in the correctional system accused of drug-
related crime is enormous and the criminal career of a drug trafficker or dealer is on
average four years.
1980s. Boyum and Reuter (2005: 29) report $134 billion in 1988 and $60 billion in 2000: “roughly one
percent of personal consumption expenditures”. It is possible that the current level may be somewhat
higher. The point is that many drug prices show a long term declining trend which accounts for lower
total sales.
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State legislations have been very strict. Many enacted harsh minimum sentences and
asset forfeiture measures. Some of these have led to expropriations of property used to
store or deal drugs even in cases when these activities took place without the knowledge
of the property owners. Some states established mandatory life sentences for anybody
found guilty of a third felony. This implies that in some states small drug dealers con-
victed for the third time end up serving longer sentences than some assassins. The num-
ber of people indicted, jailed and imprisoned on drug charges every year is huge. Each
year there are more than 1,600,000 drug arrests. The number of individuals actually in
jail for drug crimes exceeds 600,000. The number of people on probation is similar. 
Some may argue that the large number of arrests is proof that the U.S. does not pur-
sue capos. Even if the U.S. had large capos that would not mean that going against them
would end the illicit trade. As proved by the Colombian elimination of the large Medellin
and Cali cartels, their destruction did not have an effect on the size of the illicit industry.
The fact that about 25% of young black males ages 18-25 are detained or on proba-
tion is proof of harsh anti-drug policies. The government expenditure for fighting the
war on drugs is huge. Most of this expenditure (80%) takes place inside the United
States. There is no doubt that the U.S. does a lot domestically to fight drugs. It may
argued that their strategy is ineffective and that efforts should shift toward prevention,
treatment, and rehabilitation, but it can not be said that the U.S. does little. 
“In the United States Colombian traffickers are discriminated against. They receive very
harsh sentences while American traffickers and dealers receive much lower sentences”
This is often accompanied by “the American plea bargaining system is unfair because
it accepts de-facto paid testimonies given in return for lower sentences” 
This belief presents Colombian traffickers as victims of an unjust legal system. There
are no rigorous studies comparing the sentences of Colombians and Americans accused of
drug trafficking. In Colombia, however, the press has highlighted the long sentences of
some Colombians but until recently there has not been a discussion of cases of Colom-
bians who have negotiated successfully with the American authorities. Téllez and Lesmes
(2006) and Reyes (2007) have extensively documented how Colombian traffickers have
negotiated with American authorities. It appears that the first traffickers extradited did not
know how to confront the American judicial system. More important, “those arrested and
convicted kept their mouths shut... ignoring offers of lighter sentences” (Chepesiuk 2005:
39). There were reasons for this: the cartels had detailed information on their families in
Colombia who were at high risk of death if they collaborated with the U.S. justice system;
and “the organization operated through independent cells, and the members of each cell
did not know each other” (Chepesiuk 2005: 39). Many traffickers now request to be extra-
dited because they have figured out how to do so. Today it is impossible to argue that the
American judicial system discriminates against Colombians.
“The United States prohibits drugs because the C.I.A. is involved in the illegal business”
Many national security agencies and subversive groups around the world have used
illegal drugs to fund some of their activities. What happens is simple: those who are fight-
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ing for a “superior” cause are willing to sacrifice some principles they consider less impor-
tant. Spies and other security types develop links with the underworld and become friendly
with arms and drug traffickers as part of their work. For them the fight for regional or
national freedom or for national security takes precedence over the fight against drugs.
There have been documented reports of C.I.A. participation in the drug trade in
Nicaragua and other Central American countries (Scott/Marshall 1991) and in the Gold-
en Triangle (McCoy 1991). The (in)famous Iran-Contra Affair of Colonel Oliver North
is the best known case. The issue is whether these links were part of the overall policy of
the CIA or just the result of decisions made by local operatives. In any case, even if these
actions were approved at a high level, they could not have been official agency policy
but the responsibility of an individual or a small group.
The links between drugs and national security organizations and freedom fighters are
also very common. While in power, the Sandinistas used drugs to obtain funds to fight
the contras (MacDonald 1989: 34, Gugliotta/Leen 1990: Ch. 16). Similar links have
been documented between the illegal industry and the Taliban, rebel Chechnyan, Koso-
van, Chinese and other groups. Perhaps the most extreme case was the García-Meza
government in Bolivia (July 17, 1980 – August 4, 1981). During the PRI Hegemony in
Mexico the links between the federal police and drug traffickers were so strong that
some spoke of a symbiotic relationship. 
“The United States did not tolerate alcohol prohibition, why then do they prohibit
cocaine? This proves that they have double standards and that they benefit from the
cocaine market”
Assertions like this raise the expectation that the U.S. could be forced to liberalize
the cocaine market if they reach a point where they do not benefit from its illegality. Per-
haps, if Colombia floods them with cocaine, they will be forced to legalize it.
It is true that the U.S. has been the world champion of prohibition, but repressive
anti-drug policies are supported by most countries. Indeed, the world is prohibitionist. A
world prohibitionist map shows that China, all of the Islamic countries, the former USSR
and Eastern European countries, Scandinavia, all of Africa and almost all Latin America
are prohibitionist. Many of these countries are a lot more repressive than the United
States. “Liberal” countries like the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and the
U.K. are also prohibitionist. They may differentiate between consumption of soft and
hard drugs but they do not advocate a more liberal production of cocaine, heroin,
amphetamines and other illegal drugs. The world prohibitionist sentiment supports the
international prohibitionist drug control regime. Any drug liberalization effort will have
to be negotiated at the United Nations, not just with the U.S. 
The political process that led to alcohol prohibition in the U.S. was very different
from the one that resulted in the prohibition of cocaine, heroin, marijuana and other
drugs (Musto 1999: 65-68). In contrast to alcohol, in the United States there is a wide
social consensus to prohibit cocaine, heroin, amphetamines and other drugs.5 Many
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5 The consensus about marijuana prohibition is less widespread and might be breaking down.
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Americans associated opium, morphine and heroin with Chinese immigrants, marijuana
with Mexican migrant workers and cocaine with black workers (Musto 1999, Falco
1994). Users of these drugs were perceived as un-American and as deviants to be
reformed or sanctioned. Support for drug prohibition continues to be widespread across
the American mainstream as those drugs are perceived as a threat to the American way
of life.
Christianity domesticated alcohol, it ritualized its consumption, and developed social
control systems to limit the negative social consequences of alcohol addiction (Escoho-
tado 2002: chs. VIII, X and XII). This has not happened with other drugs that Christiani-
ty has associated with the devil.
“Colombia has applied the full anti-drugs prescription, all the recommended policies,
and the drug problem has not been solved. Besides, in the drug war Colombia
contributes the dead bodies. This is why Colombia should demand a different anti-drug
strategy abroad” 
There is no doubt that the Colombian government has attempted to implement very
repressive policies like massive aerial spraying of coca fields and the extradition of traf-
fickers. But it is not true that it has applied the full anti-drugs recipe. Efforts to solve the
peasant problem have been weak. Alternative development programs have not been pro-
moted aggressively and most of the funding of the existing ones has come from foreign
donors. Anti-moneylaundering laws have been enacted and a very large number of drug
traffickers’ assets have been seized, mainly land. Expropriations, however, have been
sparse. The National Drugs Directorate that manages seized assets has had very few
resources and has not been managed effectively. It has expropriated 60,000 hectares but
traffickers have succeeded in having over 1,300,000 hectares returned to them or to their
frontmen. In other words, the government has not “gone after the money”.6
It is true that Colombian drug-related casualties have been very high and as impor-
tant politicians assert, Colombia has “contributed most of the dead bodies in the war on
drugs”. This assertion implies that it is “natural” for people to kill each other when there
are large illegal profits. Illegal economic activities tend to increase violence levels; the
question, however, is why this increase has been so much greater in Colombia than in
other countries that are also involved in drug trafficking.7 There is no doubt that homi-
cide rates like the ones sustained in Colombia in the late 1980s and 1990s are terrible,
but from a social point of view it is much worse that the assassins are Colombian. The
issues to be raised are how come in Colombia the sicarios have been accepted within at
least some social groups? Can Colombia blame the outside world for that?
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6 To add insult to injury a former head of the National Drugs Directorate appointed by President Uribe
during his first term has been accused of money laundering and requested on extradition by Panama!
7 Anecdotes are the singular of data. In late 2002 after Evo Morales was ejected from Congress in Bolivia,
I had a long interview with him in which he asserted that “the situation in Chapare is intolerable; last
year four peasants were killed”. As a Colombian I could only give him a big hug and tell him how much
I envied him. 
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4) CONCLUSION
All the beliefs and arguments discussed above are exculpatory and justificatory of
Colombians who participate in the illegal drug industry. This may be an understandable
attempt to survive and succeed in an extreme, amoral, individualistic society and an
unfair world. Some of the arguments implicitly assume that a large percentage of indi-
vidual wealth in capitalist societies has been acquired illegally and that the Colombian
traffickers are fighting to have the same opportunity. If banks and first world crooks
enrich themselves illegally with drugs, why are Colombians not allowed to do the same?
In an unfair world isn’t it “natural” for those who feel wronged to break the law? This
sentiment of unfairness is general but it is stronger in reference to coca and poppy-grow-
ing peasants. Tovar Pinzón (1999: 70) describes coca and cocaine as having been
declared “illegal”. In a recent WOLA report on aerial spraying (Walsh/Sánchez-Gar-
zoli/Salinas 2008), illicit crops are always referred to as “illicitly used crops”. For them
it is clear that coca crops should not be illicit and coca-growing peasants should not be
expected to respect the law.
B. Mainstream Economists’ Explanations and Exculpatory Arguments
1) EXTERNAL SHOCK EXPLANATIONS
Some prominent economists explain the development of the illegal drug industry as
a response to an external shock suffered by the Colombian economy: the large growth
inillegal marijuana and cocaine demand in the United States and Western Europe during
the 1960s and 1970s, coupled with the recession in the Antioqueño textile industry, also
caused by external factors, that generated a large Antioqueño migration to the United
States which allowed for the development of trafficking networks (Gaviria 2000 and
2008; Robinson 2007).8
The “external shock” explanation attributes the cause of the development of the ille-
gal drug industry to “a set of fortuitous and non-repeatable events” (Gaviria 2008: 95).
The Antioqueño textile industry recession was a contributing factor as the industry was
pressured by foreign imports, an unknown but significant amount of which came into the
country as contraband. A significant migration of Antioqueños to the United States was
one of the consequences of the recession. 
This “external shock” theory is very peculiar. External shocks occur when export
prices decline or import prices increase sharply, when debtor countries face large increas-
es in international interest rates or when countries are faced with other changes that
make it difficult for them to operate in international markets. External shocks affect all
countries, not just one. For the external shock argument to be valid it would have been
necessary to have an external shock whose negative effects were concentrated on one
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8 Robinson (2007: 662) is less explicit than Gaviria but: “In the first place, there has been a massive
shock, the growth since the 1970s of the cocaine economy.” It is clear, however, that this is the result of
an external shock.
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country but which did not depend on the structural and institutional characteristics of
that country. Curiously, Colombia never exported marihuana or cocaine while they were
legal. 
2) EXTERNAL SHOCK COMPLEMENTED BY PATH DEPENDENCY ARGUMENTS
The external shock does not explain why Colombia’s dominance on the cocaine
industry has been maintained. Some argue that market forces created a path dependence
that trapped the country in illegal production and trafficking.9 According to this explana-
tion, Colombians were the first ones to respond to the growth in cocaine demandin the
U.S. in the 1970s because they were in the right place at the right time; or perhaps in the
wrong place at the wrong time. Once they established distribution networks, other possi-
ble competitors were left out of the market. 
This path dependence explanation is also very peculiar. Path dependence is usually
the result of high costs faced by producers and consumers of shifting supply sources. The
classic case of this is Microsoft vs. Apple. Experts agree that Apple is technologically
superior but Microsoft became established first and since, for most people, learning the
new system is quite costly, they continue using the inferior one. One can also conceive of
path dependence when a factory or store is located in a sub-optimal place but the costs of
moving to the best location are sufficiently high. 
Path dependence in the case of cocaine implies that despite huge illegal market prof-
its, Colombians were able to block all other competitors. Curiously though, the Colom-
bian cocaine industry is continuously shifting. New routes appear all the time, illicit
plantings move, new markets open up, as noted, new products have been developed, and
new actors continuously come onto the scene. The Colombian drug industry has evolved
in the last twenty years from one controlled by two large organizations and several small-
er ones (drug lords), to one made up of a large number of medium and small size traf-
ficking organizations that ended up being the subordinates of large armed groups (war-
lords) (Thoumi 2009). The latest developments suggest that as warlord organizations are
eliminated, many smaller armed bands (ganglords) have gained control of the production
networks and some trafficking networks. Other small “baby cartels” made up of educat-
ed, bilingual, savvy younger traffickers that follow a very low profile strategy and are
very difficult to detect control a significant proportion of new trafficking networks.
Colombian organizations have lost market share in the United States and Mexican crim-
inal organizations have become dominant in many parts of that country. What one finds
is a continuously changing path. The issue is then, why have different Colombian organi-
zations maintained significant control of cocaine production and trafficking? This would
require the willingness to use violence, intimidation, etc. That is, to master the underly-
ing illegal skills.
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9 Andrés López’ presentation in the Jorge Eliécer Gaitán lecture series, León De Greiff auditorium, Uni-
versidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, October 2, 2006. 
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3) FINANCIAL CO-RESPONSIBILITY
Others have argued that since prohibitionist policies are imposed from abroad and
result in large social costs in Colombia, it is only fair that the mainly consuming coun-
tries should compensate the mainly producing countries. Fandiño (2005) proposed a
“retributive tax” which consuming countries should pay producing countries for the con-
sequences of their mistaken repressive anti-drug policies. The co-responsibility concept
used is an attempt to make a two way street one way. It implies that consumers have all
the responsibility for the growth of the illegal drug industry: producers are only passive
actors who should be exonerated. It also implies that these passive actors do not profit
from the illegal industry. Since the industry’s growth is not related to any domestic struc-
tural or institutional characteristic, mainly producer countries should be compensated.
To conclude this section, it is interesting that both political and mainstream econom-
ic arguments explain the development of the illegal drug industry in Colombia as the
result of exogenous factors and present Colombia as a victim. These arguments implicit-
ly assume that the structural and institutional and cultural (beliefs, attitudes and values)
characteristics of Colombia and how they differ from those of other countries are of no
relevance to the development of the illegal industry. Since the reasons why the illegal
drugs industry developed were exogenous, all these arguments dismiss the possibility
that Colombia could be able to eliminate its illegal drugs industry while the world’s pro-
hibitionist policies persist. No wonder, to save Colombia the world must legalize drugs! 
IV. A neoclassical-institutional approach10
As shown above, the development of an illegal industry has necessary and contribu-
tory factors. There are no sufficient ones. The necessary ones are exogenous (interna-
tional illegal demand) stressed by the analysts discussed above, and endogenous, those
that make the country very vulnerable and prone to respond to illegal market incentives. 
There is no doubt that illegal international demand plays an important role in pro-
moting illegal production but it does not explain why Colombia concentrates on coca
and cocaine production. Cocaine is a very easy-to-produce drug: it does not require large
capital investments or specialised labor, and coca can grow all across the humid tropics.
It is also extremely valuable on the black market. Once such a product is declared illegal
across the globe, if its production and trafficking become concentrated, then it will be in
a place where it is easier to carry out illegal economic activities. In other words, the
cocaine industry is concentrated in Colombia because of internal factors. Over the last
twenty years I have explored this point (Thoumi 1987, 1995, 2003 and 2006).11
This approach argues that in Colombia there is a wide gap between formal norms
(laws, decrees, constitution) and informal behavioral norms.12 Following North (1990),
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10 The model developed in this section adheres closely to Thoumi (2003: Chapter 3).
11 In the academic literature there is no refutation of this position except for some recent efforts by Gaviria
(2006, 2008). It has been supported by UNDP (2003: 306-308) and it is consistent with Herrán (1987),
Kalmanovitz (1989), Mockus (1994) and Yunis (2003). 
12 The importance of respecting formal rules is also stressed by Gaviria (2008: 105-109).
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it is important to separate the rules of a society (institutions) from the actors that imple-
ment and enforce those rules, the organizations.13 Colombia has some strong organisms:
a strong central bank and constitutional court, armed forces that respect and support the
civil regime, some strong producer associations and other organizations (Cepeda 2004).
But having strong organisms does not mean that there is no large gap between formal
and socially accepted norms. The Colombian problem then, is not necessarily one of
weak organisms, but one of conflicting norms (institutions). 
This does not mean that the growth of the illegal drug industry has not had very neg-
ative social, political and economic consequences for the country. Indeed, it acts as a cat-
alyst that aggravates the institutional and social problems of Colombia (Thoumi 1987,
1995, 2003) and widens the norms gap. 
An important issue is whether the formal-informal rules gap has been greater in
Colombia than in other countries. Gaviria (2008) asserts that the gap between formal and
informal rules was similar across Latin America and that since the industry did not devel-
op in other countries, the formal-informal rules gap cannot be a cause of the growth of
the illegal industry in Colombia.14 As noted above, a large formal-informal norms gap is
a necessary but not a sufficient requirement for the development of the drugs industry.
Besides, norms gaps vary across societies, as different social groups impose different
constraints on their members’ behavior. A society might be very strict with regard to a
particular activity and relatively lax with regard to others. Various societies and groups
in a society may have different social controls and not all social groups participate to the
same extent in illegal activities.
The evidence regarding coca-cocaine and opium-heroin is very strong: all countries
or regions that have illegal coca or poppy plantings and that refine cocaine and heroin
and develop strong trafficking organizations have one or more important unresolved
social issues. Afghani tribal regions (most of the country) have implicit norms that differ
from many of those of the central state. The same occurs within the native and peasant
communities in Bolivia and Peru regarding coca. In many regions and in a large part of
Colombia the state has not been able to impose the rule of law, contraband and other ille-
gal activities have been socially legitimate, while many formal laws and rules have been
de facto illegitimate. Furthermore, informal norms vary among regions, generating fur-
ther norm clashes. Similar conditions are found in Myanmar and Laos, the other signifi-
cant opium producers. In Pakistan the illegal industry was concentrated in the North-
West Frontier Province, a tribal area where many of the formal laws of the rest of the
country do not apply. When Turkey was a main opium and heroin producer, that activity
was concentrated in the Kurdish area.
The norms gap discussed above can be framed within mainstream economics. The
following model developed in Thoumi (2003) does that. The mainstream economics
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13 Most of the literature on institutions mixes these two concepts and both are referred to as institutions. 
14 “Around the 1970s all governments were weak toward drugs” (84). And “Around the 1970s drug traf-
ficking was perceived as a venial form of contraband; as a way to take advantage of the moral (and unjus-
tified) protectionism of the United States” (85). At some point Gaviria appears to backtrack in this regard:
“Institutional weaknesses may have helped the initial development, but the business itself contributed
decidedly to weakening the institutions” (80). Gaviria however, does not perceive the difference between
contributing and necessary factors and considers weak institutions to be only a contributing one.
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approach considers that the decision to commit a crime is the result of a comparison of
the net benefits of the crime with the costs of the action and the expected value of the
punishment if the criminal is caught. In simple mathematical terms: 
NB = l – c – w – (pr ⋅ pu) [1]
Where: NB are the benefits that the criminal obtains from committing the crime; l is
the value of the loot; c are the costs associated with planning and executing the crime; w
is the total value of wages foregone during the period of planning and implementation of
the crime; pr is the individual’s perceived probability of being convicted, and pu is the
estimated value of the punishment given by the authorities. If the criminal is not caught,
his or her benefit will exceed NB by the amount (pr ⋅ pu), and if the criminal is caught,
his or her benefit will be lower than NB by [(1–pr) ⋅ pu].
“The simple economics approach to crime has proven quite useful in many contexts
as it can explain variations in crime through time in a particular locality, as long as the
social structure and social constraints to crime do not change. This is the model’s main
strength, but when the underlining social structure changes, it cannot be expected to
maintain its explanatory power” (Thoumi 2003). The model cannot explain differences
in crime rates across countries.15
Humans are selfish but they are also social and by being part of a society they are
subject to norms that constrain individual behavior. All societies have developed con-
trols on the production, trafficking and use of psychoactive drugs.16 These controls have
differed depending on the society in question and have taken many forms.17
Introducing social controls into equation (1) one gets: 
NB = l – c – w – (gpr ⋅ gpu) – (spr ⋅ spu) [2]
Where (gpr ⋅ gpu) refers to the probability and magnitude of government punishment
and (spr ⋅ spu) to social punishment imposed by other organisms. The latter control is an
expression of the social capital of each society. As explained elsewhere (Thoumi 2003):
“The variables l, c, w, gpr, gpu, spr and spu vary among individuals and population
groups. Individuals with good market connections to distribution networks or fences can
obtain higher prices for their loot than others, some people have a higher opportunity
cost for their time than others, and expected punishments may vary depending on con-
nections, race, ethnicity, place of residence and other individual specific characteristics.” 
The opportunity cost of the time devoted to crime, w varies between individuals. The
value of the state’s sanctions also depends on the value of time of each person, at least in
cases where freedom is lost.
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15 Thoumi (2003: Chapter 3) provides several examples to support this statement. 
16 Coleman (1990) and Searle (1995) study the demand for norms and the conditions under which norms
develop in a society.
17 See for example Siegel (1989), Morales (1989), Carter and Mamani (1986), Vidart (1991), Del Olmo
(1992), Escohotado (2002) among others.
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In some cases gpu can be negative so that –(gpr ⋅ gpu) is positive.18 Social organisms
are expected to sanction criminal behavior but some may actually encourage it. For
instance, going to jail can be a “rite of passage” that increases the status of many young
males. Additionally, tax evasion in some countries faces a very low risk of government
punishment and may be a source of pride (Guisarri 1988).
Taking into account these differences in the way in which different agencies and
social groups deal with crime sanctions, the net benefits of crime become:
NB = l – c – w – ∑(gpr ⋅ gpu) – ∑(spr ⋅ spu) [3]
ij
Where i=1....n are the different government agencies and j=1....m are the different
social organisms.
Humans develop beliefs, attitudes and values that allow them to understand the world
and live in their societies. These are generated through the socialization process particu-
lar to each society through which internalized behaviors and constraints are formed.
Individual values generate self-control so that every person has a threshold that has to be
exceeded for him or her to commit a crime. This threshold can be expressed as M, the
minimum return to crime required for the person to decide to commit a crime. Taking
into account social controls, equation (3) becomes:
NB = l – c – w – ∑(gpr ⋅ gpu) – ∑(spr ⋅ spu) – M [4]
I j
In this case, an individual chooses to commit a crime when NB is positive. This
model is consistent with the bounded rationality models used in economics and with the
New Institutional Economics and shows that the decision to commit an economic crime
depends on the value of the loot, the costs of the criminal enterprise, the strength of law
enforcement efforts and the magnitude of the legal penalties, the strength and magnitude
of social sanctions and the internalized behavioral constraints of a prospective criminal.
It shows that the decision to commit a crime depends on three types of behavioral
constraints: ∑(gpr ⋅ gpu) reflects the constraints imposed by the law and law enforcement
i
efforts; ∑(spr ⋅ spu) the social constraints which reflect the culture; and M the morals of
j
the individual. The three constraints are important in determining whether a person com-
mits a crime. These are similar to Mockus’ (1994) regulatory systems: morals and cul-
ture. Obviously, when the three are strong and complement each other, there will be few
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18 For example, a poor unemployed Colombian captured at a U.S. airport with a kilogram of drugs is sen-
tenced to a few years in jail where he has a roof, food, medical attention, access to television, radio,
education material, exercise room, and the opportunity to learn a foreign language. This increases his
standard of living. The value of the punishment to the criminal would depend on the individual’s own
comparison and evaluation of the benefits of the increased physical standard of living with the cost of
lost freedom (Thoumi 2003).
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illegal activities. But when they are weak and/or contradictory, crime levels are going to
be high. In other words, the structure and institutions of a society are key determinants of
illegal activity levels.
V. The Colombian Problem 
When the state and social enforcement efforts coincide, policy enforcement is easy.
But when they differ widely and counteract each other, law enforcement becomes very
difficult. Several studies have focused on why in Colombia it has been so difficult to
generate trust, reciprocity and solidarity; why social capital has been mostly of the
bounding type around family and small groups of friends; and why bridging social capi-
tal has been very scarce;19 why Colombia has a very weak national identity; why it devel-
oped a strongly individualist culture in which individual responsibility towards society is
very weak and behavior that disregards the effects of individual actions on others is com-
mon (Thoumi 2003, Yunis 2003, among others).
The roots of the formal-informal rules conflict can be traced back to the country’s
geography, history and the civil and government organisms that developed in Colombia.
Geography made it very difficult for the state to control the territory, to establish the rule
of law and to bind the country together. It was also responsible for the country’s low lev-
els of international trade and tax revenue. Colombia had many isolated regions that
developed with few links to each other. Colombia’s exposure to the outside world was
very limited. It received the least number of non-Spanish immigrants. The large foreign
debt inherited from Bolivar’s campaign to free Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia prevented
access to external capital funds for a century. 
The rapid mestizaje weakened native communities and social behavioral controls.
Colombia suffered a series of primary product booms and busts, but until the coffee trade
developed in the 1920s, they were in different products and different locations which
prevented the development of strong communities.
Political parties in Colombia have been atypical. In response to the weak central gov-
ernment presence in many regions, they mediated between the citizenry and the state and
became a source of identity and identification to many. The strong party loyalties allowed
La Violencia of the 1940s and 1950s in which about 200,000 died. While there have been
periods during which the homicide rate has not been an outlier in Latin America, there
have been sustained periods of high violence. Today it might be argued that a large pro-
portion of the population suffers from post-traumatic stress syndrome. One can only
speculate about its consequences. 
Internal migration in the 1950s and 1960s was large as it was in many other Latin
American countries. In Colombia, however, La Violencia played a significant role. Many
Colombian migrants were uprooted, which was not the case in other countries. This
destroyed many families and substantially weakened the social fabric and social con-
trols, including those imposed by the Catholic Church. 
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The armed forces have also been atypical. Until recently it was not their goal to con-
trol the territory, they did not have the capacity to do so and they were not a focus for
feelings of national identity or patriotism.20
Colombia is the only Latin American country that never had a real populist govern-
ment. Instead, it developed a strong clientelistic system (Robinson 2007) that avoided
many of the economic pitfalls common to other Latin American countries (Urrutia 1991).
But clientelism turns the state into a bounty and undermines the rule of law and the abil-
ity of the state to enforce its norms.
These and other factors have generated a wide gap between formal and informal
norms, hence creating an institutional conflict. This gap is complex as informal norms
vary among different social groups and regions. There is a modern Colombia that seeks
the rule of law and strives to achieve it. But there are several “other Colombias” in which
social norms promote law-breaking. The norms gap is not equal across the territory. For
instance, in Guajira there have been civic marches demanding the right to contraband
(González-Plazas 2008). 
VI. By way of conclusion
The elimination of the illegal drugs industry requires substantial social change. Fur-
thermore, the regime of international control has created a strait jacketthat cannot be
changed in the short run. Thus, Colombia will have to live within a prohibitionist world.
Current policies which largely attack factors that contribute to the development of the
illegal industry will at best lower the industry’s scope but they will not eliminate the ille-
gal industry. They do, however, have to be continued. 
The permanence of the illegal drug industry in Colombia in any of its evolving forms
is and will remain a huge obstacle to developing a modern society that can successfully
compete in the world. The illegal drug industry is a much greater source of social and
economic problems in Colombia than in mainly consuming countries and in most main-
ly producing countries. In other words, the need for change is more pressing in Colombia
than in the United States, Europe, Bolivia and Peru. 
The question is whether this need is sufficient to generate a widespread movement
within Colombia that recognizes the need to eliminate the necessary factors for the
development of the illegal industry and commits to it. This is very unlikely. Therefore,
the most likely scenario is one in which Colombians will continue giving exculpatory
arguments and the illegal industry will remain a feature of the country. Colombian gov-
ernment officials will continue requesting more funds from foreign donors to assist in
the war on drugs and some Colombian intellectuals will continue clamoring for the
world to legalize drugs, that is, to request the world to change because Colombia cannot
change. Unfortunately, the challenge for Colombia is not to legalize drugs but to legal-
ize Colombia.
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